Will the DKPP Leadership Become the First Victim of the DPR's Rules of Procedure?

JAKARTA, KOMPAS – Legal observers are questioning the actions of Commission II of the House of Representatives in summoning the leadership of the Honorary Council of Election Organizers (DKPP) for evaluation. This step is considered to be part of political bargaining that could disrupt the independence of the evaluated institution.

Constitutional law lecturer, Feri Amsari, when asked for his opinion, said that the DKPP could be said to be the first victim of the DPR's Rules of Procedure, the birth of which was suspected of being part of a political bargaining or bargaining.

"So, there will be political transactions by DKPP regarding various ongoing cases related to PHPU (disputes over election results) of regional heads. And, this is certainly unhealthy for the governance of state administration. Our state administration can be damaged because there are more efforts to provide evaluation aspects with political goals and interests," said Feri when asked for his opinion after being an expert in the trial of the 2024 Regional Head Election (Pilkada) result dispute, at the Constitutional Court, Jakarta, Tuesday (11/2).

On Tuesday afternoon, Commission II of the DPR exercised its new authority to evaluate the leaders of the institutions it has selected. The DKPP was the first target of the evaluation conducted in a closed session held on Tuesday afternoon. This new authority is stipulated in the DPR's Rules of Procedure, which were just ratified last week, specifically in Article 228A.

The article states, in order to improve the supervisory function and maintain the honor of the DPR regarding the results of the commission's discussions, the DPR can conduct periodic evaluations of candidates who have been determined in the DPR plenary meeting. The results of the evaluation are binding and are submitted by the commission conducting the evaluation to the DPR leadership for follow-up in accordance with the applicable mechanism.

The meeting with the agenda of evaluating the performance of the DKPP leadership for 2022-2027 is outlined in the hearing invitation from Commission II of the DPR addressed to the DKPP leadership. In the invitation numbered B/957/PW.01.02.2025 dated February 7, 2025, it is mentioned that the new authority of the DPR resulting from the revision of the DPR's Rules of Procedure serves as the basis for the meeting invitation.

"Based on Article 228A Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (2) of the DPR RI Regulation Number 1 of 2025 concerning Amendments to DPR RI Regulation No 1/2020 on Rules of Procedure which states 'in order to enhance the supervisory function and maintain the honor of the DPR regarding the results of the commission's discussions as referred to in Article 227 Paragraph (2), the DPR may periodically evaluate the candidates who have been determined and the evaluation results as referred to in Paragraph (1) are binding and submitted by the commission conducting the evaluation to the DPR RI Leadership for follow-up in accordance with the applicable mechanisms'," as quoted from the invitation.

The leadership of DKPP for the period 2022-2027 consists of seven people, namely the Chairman of DKPP Heddy Lugito and six members of DKPP, namely Muhammad Tio Aliansyah, Ratna Dewi Pettalolo, J Kristiadi, I Dewa Kade Wiarsa Raka Sandi, Totok Hariyono, and Yulianto Sudrajat. Three of them were proposed by the DPR, namely I Dewa Kade Wiarsa Raka Sandi, Ratna Dewi Pettalolo, and Muhammad Tio Alansyah.

The Deputy Chairman of Commission II of the House of Representatives from the Democratic Party faction, Dede Yusuf, did not deny that the evaluation meeting of the DKPP leadership was held after the new House Rules came into effect. However, he continued, the new article in the rules merely strengthens the oversight function of the House of Representatives. "So, it's not as thought, oh, that there will be something, no, it's checks and balances. So, we are carrying out evaluation functions, checks and balances, on public complaints," he added.

Once again, Feri added, this kind of practice is also not common in the concept of checks and balances where independent institutions should not be evaluated but what should be done is simply building communication. The phrase evaluation is an inappropriate and ambiguous phrase, so it can be interpreted in any direction by various parties as if the DPR is the leader of the DKPP.

"If we refer to the provisions of Article 22A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states that the general election commission consists of three institutions, namely KPU, Bawaslu, and DKPP, one of its characteristics is independence. If an evaluation is conducted, it will certainly lose its independence," said Feri.

The DPR's Code of Conduct regulations have an impact on officials in several state institutions, for example in the judicial branch there are the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Commission, as well as law enforcement agencies such as the Corruption Eradication Commission. Democratic institutions are also affected, such as members of the General Elections Commission, the Election Supervisory Agency, and also the Election Organizers Ethics Council.

Member of the Judicial Commission (KY) who is also the Head of the Human Resources, Advocacy, Legal, Research and Development Division of the KY, Binziad Kadafi, when asked for his response regarding the potential for the DPR Tatib to ensnare the KY leadership, did not wish to provide a direct response. He only quoted articles in the constitution which were later passed down into Law Number 18 of 2011 concerning the KY which provide an affirmation of the independent nature of the KY and the rules for appointment/dismissal.

KY is basically regulated in Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 NRI Constitution as an “independent” institution. In this independent character, it is universally attached to external supervisory institutions of judicial power such as KY in various countries. This independent nature is also explained as “free from interference or influence of other powers in carrying out its authority”. This is also regulated in Article 2 of Law 18/2011 concerning KY.

In addition to emphasizing the independent nature of the institution, Binziad also reminded about the appointment and dismissal of KY members by the President with the approval of the DPR as stated in Article 24 B of the 1945 NRI Constitution.

The reasons for dismissing members of the KY are also outlined in the KY Law, namely being honorably dismissed by the President upon the KY's proposal or being dishonorably dismissed by the President with the approval of the DPR and the KY's proposal if they violate their oath of office, are convicted of a crime, commit a disgraceful act, continuously neglect their obligations, and violate the prohibition on holding dual positions.

Previously, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) also criticized the DPR Tatib Regulation which was considered to be contrary to the constitution and Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD. In line with Feri, the DPR Tatib is also suspected of being an attempt to disrupt the checks and balances or balance of power between state institutions within the framework of a democratic state of law.

In its notes, YLBHI as expressed by M Isnur assessed that the latest DPR Tatib exceeds the DPR's supervisory authority. Referring to Article 185 in conjunction with Article 190 of the MD3 Law, the DPR only has the authority to give approval or consideration to candidates submitted in order to fill positions. However, the DPR does not have the authority to conduct evaluations midway or to stop the head of an institution or state official even though the official was elected in a plenary meeting of the DPR.

"Adding authority through the Tatib is an act beyond authority. More fundamentally, the ratification of the Tatib revision is an unlawful act by the authorities (onrechtmatige over heids daad) because it is believed to be contrary to the MD3 Constitution," Isnur said.

In addition to destroying the foundations of the state system by interfering with the executive and legislative branches of power, Isnur said, the implementation of the Tatib resulted in legal uncertainty for office holders in various institutions.

Moreover, the evaluation was conducted without clear measurements. In the end, the state system also became chaotic because the DPR seemed to be higher than state institutions in other branches of power.