The Asymmetry of the Iran-Israel War

"The regional nuclear monopoly of Israel that has persisted for the last four decades has triggered instability in the Middle East." This was stated by Kenneth Waltz in "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb" (Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012). However, Waltz also acknowledges that the United States and Israel would be unwilling to accept the aforementioned view. Israel seems to have sworn that there should be no nuclear power in the Middle East other than itself.

Then, when this Jewish state was convinced that Iran would be able to produce nuclear weapons within a year, it could not wait any longer. An attack was launched early Friday morning, June 13, 2025.

Israel insists on implementing a hegemonic/monopolistic nuclear policy due to the nuclear weapons possessed by Iran, which could threaten its existence, while the United States applies double standards by allowing Israel to possess nuclear weapons and pursuing other countries that wish to acquire them to the ends of the earth.

Just for the record, although neither confirm nor deny, Israel is believed to have 80-400 nuclear warheads, with the first being built between late 1966 and early 1967 (The New Arab).

Meanwhile, Iran views Israel as a very cruel and brutal Zionist, especially with its military operations demonstrated against Gaza. Until now, Iran has only been able to confront Israel by supporting resistance groups such as Hamas in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Let's leave the ideological reasons aside, and it would be good for us to listen to how the war was waged between the two countries.

The term asymmetry in the chronology of war refers to the fourth generation of warfare, often described by the metaphor "David versus Goliath," where the party considered weaker has the opportunity to prevail or inflict significant damage on the stronger party.

However, in this article, the author wishes to use the term asymmetry in the Iran-Israel conflict in relation to the tactics employed by both adversaries in conducting their warfare.

The asymmetry in the war between Iran and Israel, which began with Israel's attacks on strategic targets in Iran—particularly nuclear sites, leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, military bases, and nuclear scientists—on Friday (13/6/2025) was evident from the outset.

Israel has deployed no fewer than 200 fourth and fifth generation fighter jets, believed to be spearheaded by the radar-evading F-35 Lightning II jets (referred to as Adir in the Israel Defense Forces/IDF).

We know that, in addition to the F-35, Israel, which is reported to operate 340 fighter jets, also operates three squadrons of F-15 Eagle (one of which has been modified with Israeli technology into the F-15I, named Ra’am), and nine squadrons of F-16 (four of which are F-16I, Sufa).

Meanwhile, Iran is far behind in air power. This is where the asymmetry is evident.

Despite being said to operate 265 aircraft that are supposedly combat capable, Iran's air arsenal is very old, even including types that the Indonesian Air Force has put in a museum, such as the F-5E Tiger II. There are the F-14 Tomcat, the F-4D Phantom, but these US-made jets are also outdated. It could also be called the MiG-29 Fulcrum here (The Military Balance 2024, IISS, London).

With that asymmetry, we did not witness any aerial duel (dog fight) between Iranian and Israeli Air Force aircraft.

If Iran realizes that it does not have an Air Force comparable to the IDF, it is reasonable for it to anticipate conflict with this arch-enemy through a reliable air defense system.

However, even though it is said to possess the S-300 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) and S-200 (RS-SA-5 Gammon) air defense systems, there have been no reports indicating the actions of these military assets during the Israeli airstrikes. This may be due to insufficient numbers, inadequate combat readiness, or being struck by Israeli jets beforehand.

Amid this asymmetric landscape, on Sunday (22/6/2025, WIB), the United States deployed a B-2 Spirit bomber, which is typically based at Whiteman, Missouri. This stealth bomber, valued at 2 billion US dollars (not less than Rp 32.6 trillion), struck nuclear sites in Iran at three locations: Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow.

Given that the Fordo facility was “buried” at a depth of no less than 60 meters, the B-2 then used a GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bomb that only exploded after penetrating the ground first. The bomb with an explosive weighing 13,500 kilograms was claimed to be precise because it was guided by GPS (CNN).

The bombing was also supported by Tomahawk cruise missile attacks, which are usually used by the US to initiate attacks.

In response to the asymmetry of air power, Iran has reacted to Israel's attacks by launching ground-to-ground ballistic missiles classified as medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with conventional warheads. The most frequently mentioned type in this category is the modified version of the Shahab-3 missile.

From the news coverage available in the media so far, it is indeed Iran that has two armed forces, namely the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which appears to have launched many ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) at several cities in Israel. Although there are shortcomings, this is not without purpose.

As is known, Israel has a layered air defense system—to counter attacks from fighter jets, ballistic missiles, and drones—starting with what it proudly names the Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow.

So far, the system seems impenetrable. In reality, Iran has prepared a strategy to penetrate the Israeli system.

The method is by raining down dozens of missiles and drones on Israeli cities. This is a sophistication in itself considering the distance between Iran and Israel is 1,300-1,500 kilometers. With this tactic, the concentration of Israel's air defense is divided.

Many missiles (which are said to cost US$285 million each day) are fired to ward off relatively inexpensive drones compared to expensive warhead ballistic missiles.

When Israel was hit by this one-strike attack, ballistic missiles with large warheads arrived, featuring warheads weighing between 500 to 1,000 kilograms, not all of which could be intercepted by the Arrow system, David's Sling, or Iron Dome.

Although the Israeli authorities have prohibited the dissemination of photos or videos depicting the impact of the Iranian missile attacks, several available broadcasts show destroyed buildings.

Because not all Iranian missiles are precision-guided, such as those guided by satellites, the targets are not precise either, despite claims of successful attacks on important targets, such as government centers, military bases, or high-value targets. What has become news, however, are the residential areas and hospitals (Soroka in Beersheba).

With all the existing notes, the response to Israel's attack with missiles is something worth noting. It brings to mind the Blue Ocean Strategy business theory (W Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, 2005).

This book suggests that businesspeople should not engage in fierce competition in a highly competitive market, but rather, it is not a new battleground. In the Iran-Israel conflict, if one knows that Israel excels in air power, Iran does not counter it by competing "in the Red Sea," which is difficult to win.

Moreover, knowing that the AU IDF is not only supported by advanced generation 4.5 and 5 fighter jets, but also that its pilots are highly experienced with rigorous training. The "Six-Day War" in 1967 and the attack on June 13, 2025, serve as evidence of this.

Ballistic missiles became an inevitable choice. The program began in 1984 by re-engineering Soviet-designed Scud missiles acquired from Libya and Syria, using the reverse engineering method, assembling them, making them more sophisticated in engines and warheads, and producing them.

In innovation theory, the term "3N" is known, namely "niteni" (observing), "nirokke" (imitating), and "nambahi" (adding/improving).

The results are evident, including the emergence of ballistic missiles starting from Shahab-1 (with a range of 300 kilometers), followed by Shahab-2. The Shahab-2 type is enhanced with technology from North Korea, which has produced the Hwasong-6 missile developed from Scud-C, with a range of 500 kilometers and a warhead weighing 750 kilograms.

Armed with Shahab-1 and Shahab-2, Iran then progressed to Shahab-3, which has a range of 1,300 kilometers and the potential to carry nuclear bombs (Daily Exeter, 21/6/2025).

The Sejjil missile, which is frequently mentioned in the conflict with Israel, represents Iran's most advanced achievement. This solid-fuel rocket (unlike the liquid-fueled Shahab type) has a range of 2,000 kilometers.

Aside from Shahab and Sejjil, Iran also has other achievements, namely the Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 missiles, which are hypersonic missiles. Hypersonic missiles are those that travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound, or 6,174 kilometers per hour). The most advanced type is the Fattah-2, which has a range of 1,400 kilometers, along with maneuverability capabilities, making it difficult for Israel's anti-missile systems to intercept.

The description outlines a glimpse of Iran's offensive capabilities to counterbalance the offensive capabilities of the fighter jets possessed by Israel. Although it may seem somewhat random in targeting, some still manage to penetrate Israel's Iron Dome system, which has long been a source of pride.

Geopolitical developments such as those manifested in the Iran-Israel war necessitate a review of the country's defense strategy.

Indonesia, which is struggling to realize the minimum essential force doctrine due to financial constraints, so far still perceives defense equipment as the mainstay of defense. This is realized, among other things, in the purchase of Rafale fighter jets.

One topic that many writers underline in journalistic reports is the importance of Indonesia developing rocketry.

Actually, Indonesia already has a foundation for the development of rocket technology, as it had the Kappa rocket launch program in the 1960s, and in the 1990s to the early 2000s, there was still the RX rocket program, with the last series reaching RX-300.

It is unfortunate that the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN, before being absorbed into BRIN) was not consistent enough, leading to the conclusion that Indonesia has lost momentum in rocket development.

Today, even if we launch a rocket program for weather research, or launch peaceful satellites for monitoring natural resources, it is restricted by the US and its Western allies who enforce the missile technology control regime, where rocket development cannot exceed a range of 300 kilometers.

As with the fears surrounding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies are also greatly concerned about the spread of rocket technology. This is due to the dual-use nature of rocketry. It can be used for satellite launches, but by changing the payload, it can also serve as a missile launcher.

From a historical perspective, the United States was deeply traumatized when the Soviet Union successfully launched the artificial satellite Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957. This implicitly demonstrated that the Soviet Union had achieved superiority in long-range or intercontinental rockets. The United States felt threatened, prompting President John F. Kennedy to announce the "Moon Program" in 1961.

Now, although there is MTCR, Indonesia, based on the Iran-Israel War and observing Iran's resistance, needs to reassess its war doctrine. We must honestly acknowledge that our offensive and defensive capabilities are very weak.

As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1970 and having ratified it in 1995, Indonesia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In this regard, Indonesia views the monopoly of Israel and other nuclear countries—namely the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, along with India, Pakistan, and South Korea—as something unjust and a threat to global safety.

In this context, Kenneth Waltz's perspective is arguably only half correct because with Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, the security risks in the Middle East have also increased, although there are counterarguments.

What is clear is that there are two things that deserve our attention.

First, wars, as history shows, arise from often irrational considerations.

Second, in nuclear doctrine, what applies is mutually-assured destruction. That is why nuclear war is called uniwinnable, it cannot be won.

The Iran-Israel war has long been anticipated to occur. It is our hope that this war can be de-escalated so as not to endanger global security. Without this war, the current state of the world can be described as unfavorable, especially if the conflict expands, igniting the Middle East, and worse, triggering World War III. It is indeed a risk that is difficult for us to imagine.

Ninok Leksono Senior Journalist, Alumnus Department of War Studies, King's College, London