Shin Tae-yong's Analysis for the Indonesian National Team Ahead of the Match Against Bahrain

JAKARTA, KOMPAS – Although he is no longer coaching the Indonesian national team, Shin Tae-yong is willing to provide analysis regarding the crushing 1-5 defeat to Australia. The South Korean coach assessed that there were three causes of the national team's defeat that must be evaluated immediately to achieve maximum results against Bahrain at the Gelora Bung Karno Main Stadium, Jakarta, Tuesday (3/25/2025).

Shin delivered the analysis after attending a joint viewing of the Indonesia vs Australia match at the Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia. As was his habit when he was still accompanying the team, Shin also could not hide his expression of anxiety when watching Indonesia being slaughtered by Australia.

He was seen holding his head and covering his face with both hands when Indonesia conceded a goal or failed to take advantage of a golden opportunity. During his time in charge of Indonesia, Shin was known as an expressive coach. Shin did not hesitate to argue from the sidelines if he considered a number of referee decisions to be detrimental to Indonesia.

After no longer being part of the Indonesian national team due to his contract being terminated by PSSI, Shin is still willing to provide a piece of analysis regarding the performance of his former team when they lost to Australia. According to Shin, there were three things that became the turning point in Indonesia's defeat despite being active in attacking, namely Kevin Diks' failed penalty execution, failing to guard opposing players, and weakness in anticipating dead balls.

"Of course (the opponent) missed a lot of time in man-to-man marking. So maybe that was the cause of the defeat. Yes, it was also in the set-piece. It's really unfortunate that there was no need to concede a goal from a set-piece," Shin said.

The players worked hard, the pressing of the front players was good.

With the new coach, Patrick Kluivert, the Indonesian national team appeared dominant over Australia from the start of the match. The “Garuda” team even got two golden opportunities to take the lead first. First through Jay Idzes' header which was still thwarted by Mathew Ryan. Second through Kevin Diks' penalty which hit the goal post.

Diks' penalty moment was the climax of the attacking scheme instructed by Kluivert. Facing Australia at their home base, the Indonesian players played pressing by trying to disrupt the Australian players when building attacks from the back. The pressing technique from the front was one of the consequences of the idea of playing "total football" brought by Kluivert.

Despite only having time to practice twice, the Indonesian national team's front line consisting of Rafael Struick, Ole Romeny, and Marselino Ferdinan were relatively able to translate Kluivert's thoughts onto the field. This was also acknowledged by Shin who praised the hard work of the Indonesian forwards in carrying out pressing.

"The players worked hard, the pressing of the front players was good," said Shin.

However, football has the law of action and reaction. When one team creates a formula, the opposing team will develop an anti-formula to counter it. In Indonesia's case, facing Australia who are fluent in defending using a pressing approach was a big mistake.

This was compounded by Indonesia's disorganized defensive structure. Kluivert was very good at training the Indonesian players to press, but he seemed to have missed out on providing a decent defensive rest pad when Australia threatened on the counter-attack.

This laxity in rest defense ultimately made the Australian players appear very free to flow the ball when counterattacking. Due to high pressing, three Idzes and Calvin Verdonk who should have remained in their positions were pulled to move far forward. The movement of Idzes and Verdonk created a hole in the defense that Australia was able to exploit to score the second goal.

Indonesia's dominance of possession was not due to Kluivert's attacking approach. Instead, it was Australia's weapon. The "Socceroos" deliberately let Indonesia attack in order to leave a hole.

Shin knows Australia's trick of deliberately letting the opponent control the ball and then hitting back through lightning transitions. Shin experienced this when Indonesia lost 0-4 to Australia in the 2024 Asian Cup. Learning from that experience, Shin chose a defensive approach so that Australia would not exploit it in the first meeting of the 2026 World Cup qualifiers in Jakarta. As a result, Indonesia was able to hold Australia to a 1-1 draw.

Unlike Shin, Kluivert seemed a little naive by still forcing a total attacking strategy against Australia who were very well organized in transition. In the next match, Kluivert and his two assistants, Alex Pastoor and Danny Landzaat, must apply a more suitable approach or strategy to face Bahrain. The philosophy of "total football" is indeed too noble to be denied, but tactics that are anti-formula from the opponent are much more urgent to be implemented.

The final result might have been very different if Diks had been able to convert the penalty into a goal. Being able to take the lead early in the match would have likely forced Australia to revise its strategy. Tony Popovic's team would have been tempted to play more forward and openly in order to catch up on the goal deficit. This was Shin's second implicit advice about using even the smallest opportunity, especially a penalty, to score a goal.

Facing Bahrain, the negligence of the “Garuda” team in anticipating set pieces (dead balls) must not be repeated. Three of Australia's five goals came from set pieces. Bahrain's players who are strong in one-on-one duels and aerial balls will be greatly advantaged if Indonesia does not immediately fix this weakness.