TNI, Where Are You Going?

More than 20 years since its enactment, Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI was finally revised in early 2025. There is a common thread between these two time periods, namely making the TNI a more professional military entity.

For the public, the TNI is the most trusted institution, even above the DPR and the President. This perception is consistent in a survey of the level of trust in state institutions conducted by Litbang Kompas.

For the military, public acceptance not only brings pride and happiness. However, from the perspective of the universal people's defense doctrine, public support for the military is the most crucial aspect, even more important than warships and fighter jets.

However, the challenges faced by the TNI and the Indonesian nation are becoming increasingly complex. There are wars in Europe and the Middle East. Many predict that the next open conflict will occur in the South China Sea. On the other hand, separatism in Papua has persisted over the past 50 years.

On the other hand, technological development is accelerating. Technology changes the form of threats, as does the way the military addresses them.

Israel utilizes Artificial Intelligence and drones without human intervention, targeting Hamas leaders. In Ukraine, Russian warships were defeated by drones made by Ukrainian citizens. Singapore has established a Cyber Force, China has created a Rocket Force, and Ukraine has formed a Drone Force.

The development of technology, which is rich in data and relies on rapid decision-making and execution to address threats with high complexity, necessitates changes in militaries worldwide. Thus, the revision of the TNI Law this time serves as a momentum to primarily strengthen TNI in terms of human resources (HR), enabling it to become an effective and adaptive military.

Unfortunately, although modern warfare has become the narrative of Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Commander of the Armed Forces General Agus Subiyanto, the substance of the revision of the Armed Forces Law does not reflect the preparation of the Armed Forces as a capable military force.

Certain aspects indeed deserve appreciation, such as the requirement for active officers holding civilian positions outside the designated ones to retire or resign. The list of civilian institutions that can be entered is also mentioned and clearly related to defense.

Apart from the sake of proportional civil-military relations, a military member who goes back and forth between civil and military institutions will have a negative impact on the TNI because it reduces cohesion.

However, in general, the revision of the TNI Law concerns three pragmatic matters, namely the Ministry of Defense which handles the procurement, recruitment and maintenance of the main weapons system (alutsista); the addition of civilian institutions that can be occupied by the TNI, and the addition of the retirement age. Several important aspects of the military such as professionalism, operational readiness, strategic thinking, and the importance of responding to rapidly changing strategic developments are not visible.

In the revision of the TNI Law, there is no apparent change in orientation for the TNI to focus on improving its capabilities. Regarding Military War Operations, there are no changes, as are the main tasks of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

For cyber, there is no apparent intensity for military cyber, apart from the inclusion of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) to help the government deal with cyber threats.

The TNI's capability development space for Space is also not visible. Several elements of modern warfare such as information warfare, nuclear, biological and chemical, have also not changed. In general, it is not yet visible how the TNI will be more agile and adaptive.

In fact, the retirement age will be increased. Previously, all non-commissioned officers retired at the age of 53, and high-ranking officers retired at the age of 58. In the revised TNI Law, retirement is 58 for officers with the rank up to Lieutenant Colonel. High-ranking 4-star officers can be extended at any time according to the president's policy. Consecutively, officers with the rank of Colonel can retire at the age of 59, high-ranking officers with 1 to 3 stars retire at 60-62 years.

The ranks of policy makers in the TNI will become older. The TNI Commander's statement about accelerating promotion is contradictory because according to him, it would be better if the battalion commander with the rank of lieutenant colonel was younger. However, at the same time, for generals, the higher their rank, the older they are.

According to TNI researcher Kusnanto Anggoro, increasing the retirement age is feared to increase career stagnation that has occurred for decades.

After the elimination of the dual function of ABRI (the name of the TNI-Polri in the New Order era), many TNI member channels to positions were closed, while recruitment at the educational level remained the same, even increasing. This was exacerbated by the TNI Law which in 2004 increased the retirement age for officers from 55 to 58. "Until now, there are around 371 high-ranking officers in the army, while the available positions are only 150 or so," said Kusnanto.

Indonesian military researcher Evan Laksmana referred to the existence of subjective political interests in 2004.

Meanwhile, General (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto said that the increase in retirement age at that time had nothing to do with the political interests of the transition from the 5th President of the Republic of Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri to the 6th President of the Republic of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. "The consideration is the productive age," said Endriartono.

However, the TNI Commander from 2002-2006 admitted that the increase in the retirement age then caused stagnation for years to come. Years of TNI personnel development could not solve this.

According to Kompas records processed from various sources, there are currently around 450 colonels and high-ranking officers who do not have positions. On the other hand, there is a shortage of around 50,000 at the lieutenant colonel, major, captain, and first lieutenant levels.

As a result, the junior and middle-ranking officers are multitasking, or the organization is empty. The TNI's policy of developing the organization for years has indeed provided positions for high-ranking officers, but then the organization is empty. This trend is likely to continue with the addition of Kodam, the formation of 100 Territorial Development Battalions, and the Naval Regional Command.

This was even conveyed by the TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto, some time ago.

"There are organizations that have been formed but their main tasks and authorities are still unclear in my opinion, the first is Kogabwilhan (Joint Regional Defense Command) which was actually formed only to add positions first. However, its main tasks and authorities are not yet clear," said Agus at the 2025 TNI Leadership Meeting (Rapim) at the TNI Headquarters, Cilangkap, East Jakarta, Friday (31/1/2025).

Evan said, the defense transformation so that Indonesia has a capable TNI as the main force is influenced by three aspects, namely civil-military relations, effective military, and efficient defense management. All three form a TNI that has high capabilities.

"The question of military capability can only be answered with the skills and abilities of officers. This means that meritocracy must be clear," he said.

This opens up a deep problem in TNI personnel due to the lack of meritocracy. The solution presented by the TNI Commander in a meeting with Commission I of the DPR regarding the early retirement mechanism through the First Service Bond (IDP) and the Advanced Service Bond (IDL), is not something new. Formally, IDP and IDL have a legal basis in the form of Government Regulation (PP) No. 39/2010 and the Minister of Defense Regulation (Permenhan) No. 27/2012. However, it has not been implemented consistently.

Personnel policies change every few years. In fact, the military should be a stable institution, so that capability development can be sustainable. Therefore, promotion policies and career paths must be clear and standardized so that they are predictable.

Currently, the promotion process is dominated by subjectivity, so that meritocracy is hampered. Many young officers complain about the less scientific and less comprehensive methods in assessing someone. In fact, the talent scouting system in the Indonesian Army, for example, actually exists.

Thus, there are plus points for those who, for example, excel in Papua or excel in schools abroad. However, the system has not been institutionalized so that again feelings of like or dislike arise.

In promotion meetings, often only general resumes are looked at. There are no details about performance. As a result, many soldiers play it safe, wanting to complete their assignments as soon as possible, without daring to innovate. "Usually it just comes down to who knows who, which general brought who," said an officer.

This situation with minimal meritocracy is vulnerable to politicization and damages the TNI institution from within. One of the changes to the TNI Law that is also vulnerable to politicization is the change to Article 3, namely the TNI's strategic planning which is in the coordination of the Ministry of Defense.

The strategic planning includes procurement budgeting, even weapons maintenance and care, and recruitment are under the Ministry of Defense. On paper this can be seen as civilian supremacy. However, in reality, the Minister of Defense who comes from a political party can bring his interests, both economic and political.

Finally, like the old song sung by Bing Slamet, the important question for the executive and legislative is where do you want to take the TNI? As President Prabowo Subianto often says, civic pacem para bellum, meaning those who want peace must prepare for war. As the main component, the TNI's task is to prepare for war. Don't let all tasks be able to be done, except for its main tasks.