The Issue of the Fate of Minorities and the Future of New Syria

The bloody clash in the coastal regions of Syria (covering the areas of Latakia, Tartus, Banias, and Jableh) on Thursday, March 6, 2025, which claimed nearly 1,000 lives, represents the first test for the new Syrian government led by President Ahmed Al Shaara. The bloody incident in the coastal regions of Syria can actually be viewed from two perspectives.

First, viewing the event as the most destabilizing security incident in Syria following the fall of President Bashar Al Assad's regime on December 8, 2024. Second, as a political message regarding the fate of minorities in Syria.

The coastal region of Syria is known as the base of the Alawite Shia minority, which constitutes approximately 9 percent of Syria's total population of around 25 million people. The Al Assad family, which has ruled Syria from 1970 until December 8, 2024, originates from the Alawite Shia minority. The bloody events in Syria's coastal region are undoubtedly linked to the issue of the concentration of the Alawite Shia minority in that area.

The issue of the fate of Syria's minority groups is indeed one of the many challenges faced by the new Syrian government in its efforts to build unity and cohesion within the country. There are several minority groups in Syria, such as the Kurds (approximately 10 percent of Syria's population) in northeastern and northern Syria, the Alawite Shiites (approximately 9 percent) in western Syria (coastal areas), the Druze (approximately 3.2 percent) in northwestern and southern Syria, as well as the Orthodox Christians (approximately 10 percent) in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and coastal regions.

The legitimacy of the new Syrian government under the leadership of President Ahmed Al Sharaa can only be achieved if it succeeds in uniting all elements of the Syrian people, consisting of both the majority and minority groups. This is not an easy issue for the new Syrian government. The reason is that there are still many remnants of loyalists to the former regime of President Bashar Al Assad who currently act as sleeper cells, as well as regional or international powers whose interests have been harmed by the fall of the former regime of President Bashar Al Assad.

The parties whose interests are harmed can easily exploit minority groups to disrupt security and even launch counterattacks to overthrow the new Syrian government. Playing the minority card can quickly and easily garner a response from the international community.

The bloody clash in the coastal region of Syria on Thursday, December 6, 2025, serves as an example of actions by remnants of loyalists of former President Bashar Al Assad, utilizing the minority Alawite community's base area to disrupt security by attacking security forces in the coastal region. It thus becomes difficult to distinguish between the actual instigators of the actions, namely the remnants of loyalists of former President Al Assad, and the Alawite minority whose area has been used as the starting point for security disruption activities.

When the security forces launched a counterattack, the casualties of the innocent Alawite civilian minority were inevitable, because the remaining loyalists of former President Al Assad took refuge in the Alawite base areas. Even some of the Christian minorities in the coastal areas also became victims in the semi-open war between the Syrian security forces and the remaining loyalists of former President Al Assad.

Reporting by many Western media often places more emphasis on the issue of clashes between the new Syrian government and the minorities in Syria in the case of clashes in the coastal region.

Middle Eastern media, such as Al Jazeera television station and Asharq Al Awsat daily immediately neutralized the Western media's report by explaining that the bloody clashes in the Syrian coastal region were between security forces and the remaining loyalists of former President Al Assad, not between the government and the minority.

So the danger of the minority issue being exploited by certain groups for certain political purposes was immediately read by Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa. That is behind Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa on Monday, March 10, 2025, signing an agreement with the Leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi as the representative of the Kurdish minority.

The agreement integrates all SDF institutions into the new Syrian government and the Syrian state guarantees the citizenship and constitutional rights of the Kurds. The new Syrian authorities on Tuesday, March 11, 2025 also managed to sign an agreement with the Suwayda Military Council representing the Druze minority. The agreement also confirms that the Suwayda province controlled by the Druze minority is integrated into the new Syrian government.

The move by Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa to immediately reach an agreement with the Kurdish and Druze minorities is certainly so that the bloody events in the Alawite minority pockets in the coastal areas of Syria do not spread to other minority pockets. Learning from the bloody events in the coastal areas of Syria, Al Sharaa is very worried that the remaining loyalists of former President Al Assad will also use other minorities to fight against the new Syrian government.

If all minority pockets are in turmoil, then the new Syrian government will face major problems in its relations with regional and international groups that are calling on the new Syrian government to guarantee the rights of minorities. Of course, President Al Sharaa, who is struggling to strengthen his legitimacy in the regional and international arena, does not want the bloody events in the coastal areas to happen again and also spread to other minority areas.

An agreement between the new Syrian government and the Alawite Shia minority is also awaited in an effort to guarantee the rights and security of the Alawite minority in Syria, as are agreements with the Kurdish and Druze minorities.*